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THE UNITED STATES HAS STRUGGLED WITH DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING and 
the providing of affordable, workforce or low-income housing for de-
cades. This paper summarizes and analyzes the problems and opportu-
nities created in large measure by federal and state courts, together with 
guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment to address these issues and problems. First, the paper ad-
dresses the problem of discrimination in housing and remedies broadly 
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court under the U.S. Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) in the recent case of Inclusive Communities v. Texas Department 
of Community Affairs. Then follows a discussion of recent HUD guid-
ance by way of administrative rule, together with a summary of how 
federal courts address discrimination in housing following the Inclusive 
Communities decision. Second, this paper addresses the concept of in-
clusionary zoning as a potential remedy for the construction of new af-
fordable or workforce housing by placing the burden on the land devel-
opment community as a condition or conditions for land development 
approval. The paper concludes that while discrimination in housing 
has been well-addressed by the courts, providing a remedy even when 
government does not intentionally discriminate against potential poor 
residents on the basis of race, religion, handicapped, or family status, 
the use of inclusionary zoning presents clear problems under the U.S. 
Constitution despite the occasional support of such inclusionary zoning 
by a few state courts. 
David L. Callies, FAICP, ACREL, is the Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law at the 
University of Hawaii Richardson School of Law, where he teaches land use, state and 
local government and real property. J.D., University of Michigan; LL.M., University 
of Nottingham, Life Member, Clare Hall College, Cambridge University. The author 
wishes to acknowledge and thank Brian Connally, Ed Voss, and Don Elliot, co-
panelists in several recent national programs on the Fair Housing Act and the Inclusive 
Communities decision, which helped form the basis of this paper. Derek B. Simon is 
an associate in the Honolulu office of Carlsmith Ball, LLP. This paper is a revised ver-
sion of an article first published at 4 Journal of International and Comparative Law 39 
(2017). 
688 THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 49, No.4 FALL 2017 
I. The Problem: Discrimination in the United States 
A. Government-Sponsored Segregation: 
Discriminatory Ordinances 
Following the Great Migration of African Americans from rural coun-
ties to cities at the turn of the 20th century, and fearing their increasing 
purchasing power, concerned white homeowners turned to their local 
governments to prevent integration of their neighborhoods. 1 Many local 
governments responded by enacting residential segregation ordinances.2 
Typically, these ordinances either: "(1) prohibited whites from moving 
to all-Negro blocks and Negroes from moving to all-white blocks; (2) di-
vided the city into segregated districts and designated a district for each 
race; or (3) restricted new residences in mixed blocks to the racial group 
which had established most of the residences on the block."3 
In 1910, the City of Baltimore became the first municipality to enact 
such an ordinance, preventing African Americans from moving onto 
blocks with a white majority and vice versa.4 The stated purpose of 
the ordinance was "preserving peace, preventing conflict and ill feel-
ing between the white and colored races in Baltimore, and promoting 
the general welfare of the city by providing, so far as practicable, for 
the use of separate blocks by white and colored people for residences, 
churches and schools."s By 1912, Mooresville and Winston-Salem, North 
Carolina had passed similar ordinances.6 By 1913, Asheville, North Ca-
rolina; Richmond, Norfolk, and Roanoke, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; 
Madisonville, Kentucky; and Greenville, South Carolina had followed 
suit? By 1916, the popularity of segregation ordinances had also reached 
Birmingham, Alabama; Louisville, Kentucky; St. Louis, Missouri; and 
New Orleans, Louisiana.8 The prevalence of these ordinances persisted 
l. See generally David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Bu-
chanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND L. REv. 797, 835 (1998) (dis-
cussing the prevalence of discriminatory ordinances during the migration of African 
Americans to the North). 
2. See Josh Whitehead, Using Disparate Impact Analysis to Strike Down Exclu-
sionary Zoning Codes, 33 REAL EST. L.J. 359, 362--63 (2005). 
3. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 835. 
4. See TOM C. CLARK & PHILIP B. PERLMAN, PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY: AN HISTORIC 
BRIEF AGAINST RACIAL COVENANTS 11 (1948) (originally submitted as amicus brief in 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948». 
5. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 692 (May 15, 1911); see also Garrett Power, Apart-
heid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913,42 MD. 
L. REv. 289, 289 (1983), for an in-depth discussion on the Baltimore ordinance and 
other similar ordinances. 
6. See Whitehead, supra note 2, at 362-63. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
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until 1917, when the Supreme Court decided Buchanan v. Worley9 and 
invalidated this thinly veiled form of state-sponsored discrimination. 10 
B. Segregation by Contract: Restrictive Covenants 
From 1917, when Buchanan was decided, until 1948, racially restric-
tive covenants became the primary legal means for perpetuating seg-
regationY Typically, under these covenants, property owners would 
warrant not to sell or lease real property to "any person not of the Cau-
casian race."12 Racially restrictive covenants were exceptionally effec-
ti ve during this time because "Lochner -era 13 courts consistently en-
forced them, contributing to the dramatic increase in residential 
segregation during the first half of the 20th century."14 
This form of discrimination was not wholly private. As one com-
mentator explains, "[i]t is virtually impossible to overstate the signifi-
cance of [the federal government's] involvement in creating, sponsor-
ing, and perpetuating the racially segregated dual housing markets that 
divide America."15 For example, the Federal Housing Administration 
actively promoted the use of racially restrictive covenants, frequently 
refusing to provide its mortgage insurance or guarantees unless the 
covenants were attached to the deeds. 16 The widespread acceptability 
of racially restrictive covenants was substantially abdicated in 1948, 
when the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Shel-
ley v. Kramer,17 holding that judicial enforcement of the covenants vi-
0lated the Fourteenth Amendment. ls 
9. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
10. See id at 74-75. 
1l. See CLARK & PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 1l. 
12. See Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of the Laws-Judicial Enforcement of 
Racial Restrictive Covenants Is State Action Prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1450, 1450 (1948). 
13. Named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the "Lochner-era" re-
fers to the period of time between 1897 to 1937 during which the Supreme Court uti-
lized a broad interpretation of due process that protected economic rights, tended to 
strike down economic regulations of working conditions, wages, or hours in favor 
of laissez-faire economic policy. 
14. Davidson M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 MICH. L. REv. 
1541, 1561 (2002). 
15. John O. Calmore, Spatial Equity and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-
to-the Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1487, 1509 (1993). 
16. See id. at 1509-10 (outlining how the discriminatory policies of the Federal 
Housing Administration and VA significantly transformed the nation's patterns of 
homeownership along racial lines). 
17. 334 U.S 1 (1948). 
18. See id. at 20. 
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C. The Battles of Today 
As the preceding discussion indicates, by 1948 both discriminatory or-
dinances and racially restrictive covenants had been outlawed by the 
Supreme Court. The discriminatory intent behind these mechanisms 
is patently obvious. Present-day housing segregation, however, is per-
petuated by more subtle means. Indeed, since the FHA's enactment in 
1968, courts have accepted disparate impact claims challenging a wide 
range of practices, including zoning ordinances,19 administration of sec-
tion vouchers,2o lending practices,21 mortgage insurance policies,22 land-
lord and housing provider reference policies,23 occupation restrictions,24 
and the demolition of subsidized housing.25 
II. Fair Housing and Discrimination in Housing 
A. Discriminatory Impact and Disparate Impact 
1. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ACT: A SUMMARY 
In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA "following the urban unrest of the 
mid -1960s and the chaotic aftermath of the assassination of the Rev. 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr."26 The FHA's goal: to provide, "within con-
stitutional limitations, fair housing throughout the United States.'m 
Congress believed the FHA's proscription of discriminatory housing 
practices would "remove the walls of discrimination which enclose mi-
nority groups"28 and "replace ghettos with truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns. ,,29 
The thrust of the FHA is found within its two primary substantive 
provisions. First, 42 U.s.c. § 3604(a), makes it unlawful "to refuse 
to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or refuse to nego-
tiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make available or deny, a 
19. See Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
937-38 (2d Cir. 1988). 
20. See Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Rela-
tions Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 376--77 (6th Cir. 2007). 
21. See Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251,258 (D. Mass. 2008). 
22. See Nat'! Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 
46, 63 (D.D.C. 2002). 
23. See Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Edgewater Park Owners Coop, Inc., No. 10-
CV-912 (RPP), 2012 WL 762323, at 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012). 
24. See United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1360 (D. Haw. 1995). 
25. See Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 419 F.3d. 729, 749-42 (8th 
Cir.2005). 
26. H.R. REp. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988). 
28. 114 CONGo REc. 9563 (1968) (statement of Sen. Cel1er). 
29. 114 CONGo REc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
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dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status or natural origin."3o 
Second, 42 U.S.c. § 3606(b), makes it unlawful to "discriminate 
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental 
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in the connec-
tion therewith. "31 
2. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ACT IN DETAIL 
The FHA protects the following classes, and no others (in particular, 




d. sex (but not sexual orientation) 
e. Family status. This class protects primarily parents with children 
under 18 from discrimination. This includes foster families and 
recipients of aid to families with dependent children. Licensed, 
age-restricted elderly living communities are exempt from com-
pliance with this provision. It does not ban housing in favor of 
households with children. 42 U.s.c. §§ 3602(k) and 3607(b) 
f. national origin 
g. handicapped status. A physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of such persons major life activities, 
a record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an 
impairment. It does not include current, illegal use of or addic-
tion to a controlled substance, but it does include past drug or al-
cohol addictions and HIV infections. This class protects not only 
persons with disabilities, but also persons associated with dis-
abled persons. 42 U.s.c. § 3602(h). Handicapped conditions 
not considered disabilities under the FHA include emotional dis-
turbance, homelessness, history of abuse, post-incarceration in 
halfway houses, or juvenile delinquency. The FHA prohibits a 
refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, rea-
sonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be oc-
cupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988). 
3l. 42 U.S.C. § 3606(b). 
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afford such person full enjoyment of the premises. (42 U.S.c. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(a)). Such modifications include installation of 
ramps, railings, and so forth, at the expense of the disabled per-
son, though the landlord may require restoration of the alter-
ations to the condition that existed prior to the making of the al-
terations. The FHA also prohibits refusing to make reasonable 
accommodations in rules, policies, and practices or services 
when such accommodation may be necessary to afford a disabled 
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. (42 U.s.c. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(b)). Since this applies to both private and public 
rules, it applies to homeowners association rules, condominium 
association rules, apartment policies, zoning, building and hous-
ing codes. 
A "dwelling" under the FHA is any building, structure, or portion 
thereof which is occupied as a residence by one or more families 
and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construc-
tion or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion 
thereof. It is illegal under the FHA to refuse to sell or rent after the 
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or 
rental of, or otherwise make available or deny, a dwelling. (42 
U.s.c. § 360(4). Zoning or building regulations are especially vulner-
able. In addition to local governments (including local government 
services and public utilities), private landowners, real estate agents, 
mortgage lenders, and landlords must comply. 
B. Discriminatory Intent 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1976 in Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corporation that the U.S. Constitu-
tion's equal protection clause provided relief in cases involving discri-
mination in housing if, but only if, the plaintiff alleging discrimination 
can demonstrate that the defendant local or state government intends 
to discriminate against the plaintiff. Disproportionate impact alone 
would be insufficient. 
In 1971, the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 
(MHDC) sought rezoning of a IS-acre parcel of land in the village 
of Arlington Heights, Illinois from a single-family to a multiple-family 
zoning classification. With the aid of federal financial subsidies pro-
vided under Section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned 
to construct 190 townhouse units in 20 two-story townhouse buildings: 
100 single-bedroom units for senior citizens and 90 two, three, and 
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four-bedroom units for families with low or moderate incomes. The 
development was to be called Lincoln Green. 
Following a recommendation of the Arlington Heights Plan Com-
mission, the village board of trustees denied the zoning request. 
MHDC and other named plaintiffs sued in the U.S. District Court al-
leging that the denial was racially discriminatory, violating the 14th 
Amendment as well as the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 
The district court upheld the decision of the board of trustees but 
was reversed by the Seventh Circuit in June 1975, which was, in 
turn, reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Village of Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located 
approximately 26 miles northwest of downtown. It is primarily a bed-
room suburb, zoned largely for single-family detached houses. Ac-
cording to the 1970 census, the village population was 64,000, only 
27 of whom were black. The 15 acres in question, part of an 80-acre 
parcel just east of the center of the village, are owned by the Clerics 
of St. Viator. While part of the site is occupied by St. Viator's High 
School and a three-story novitiate building, much of the site is vacant. 
The entire site and all of the surrounding area was, and is, zoned R-3, 
single-family detached. Single-family homes abut the property on two 
sides; on the other two sides is the vacant St. Viator property. The pro-
posed IS-acre development would have maintained much of the open 
space, with shrubs and trees screening the homes directly abutting the 
property, but would have required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family 
classification to permit townhouses at the density proposed. 
During the spring of 1971, the village plan commission considered 
the proposal at three public meetings. At the hearings, MHDC submit-
ted studies demonstrating the need for housing of the type proposed. 
Evidence offered at trial indicated many of those attending the plan 
commission were vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln 
Green, while others testified in its favor. Some of the comments 
from both opponents and supporters of the rezoning petition addressed 
the "social issue" of introducing low and moderate-income housing 
that would probably be racially integrated into Arlington Heights. 
But the Supreme Court found that most of the opponents focused on 
the zoning aspects of the petition, stressing the single-family character 
of the neighborhood, the reliance by neighboring citizens upon that 
character, and, perhaps most important, Arlington Heights' policy con-
cerning multiple-family zoning. Adopted by the village board in 1962 
and amended in 1970, the policy was that R-5 zoning should constitute 
a buffer between single-family and commercial, industrial, or other 
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high intensity land uses. Lincoln Green did not meet this requirement, 
since the property is completely surrounded by single-family zoned 
property. 
Relying primarily on its decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976), decided after the Court of Appeals decision but before oral 
argument in this case, the Court reiterated that official action would 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it resulted in a racially dis-
proportionate impact. In as plain words as can be imagined, the Court 
held: "Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Absent that show-
ing, the Court said, the Court of Appeals' finding of a "discriminatory 
'ultimate effect' is without independent constitutional significance." 
If, then, secretive motive rather than discernible effect is the critical 
factor, how is that motive to be shown? The Court offers five possible 
approaches: 
First, the Court suggests that while racial impact is not the ultimate 
test, proof of racial impact may in some cases be helpful in proving the 
required racial motive: "Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on 
grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action 
even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face." How-
ever, it is clear that the pattern must be "stark" and that "impact alone 
is not determinative." 
Second, the Court suggests that motive might be demonstrated by 
an historical background that "reveals a series of official actions 
taken for invidious purposes." Apparently, however, the type of his-
toric pattern of inaction and indifference to segregation found by the 
Seventh Circuit was unpersuasive to the Supreme Court. 
Third, the Court says the specific sequence of events leading to the 
challenged decision may be persuasive of racial motive if it betrays a 
departure either from normal procedures or from substantive standards 
usually considered important. 
Fourth, if contemporaneous statements of the decision-makers reveal 
racial motive, that would be relevant. Statements of citizens addressing 
the decision-makers seem, however, if relevant at all, to carry much less 
weight. 
Finally, the Court said: "In some extraordinary instances the mem-
bers might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the pur-
pose of the official action, although even then such testimony frequently 
will be barred by privilege." 
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Against the backdrop of nine circuit courts of appeals having al-
ready found claims of disparate impact cognizable,32 Congress revis-
ited the FHA in 1988, adding several significant amendments. First, 
Congress granted HUD authority to adjudicate housing discrimination 
claims33 and to promulgate regulations necessary to effectuate the 
FHA's goals. 34 Second, Congress created three exceptions to liability, 
clarifying that the FHA does not prohibit: (1) "conduct against a per-
son because such person has been convicted ... of the illegal manu-
facture or distribution of a controlled substance;,,35 (2) "reasonable 
local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number 
of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling;"36 or (3) "a person en-
gaged in the business of furnishing appraisals of real property to 
take into consideration factors other than race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex, handicap, or familial status.'m These amendments have 
been widely interpreted as presupposing the existence of disparate im-
pact liability. 38 
2. THE INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES DECISION 
On June 25, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Texas Department 
of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities. That it 
upheld the use of disparate impact as the test for discriminatory impact 
is no particular surprise since nine of the eleven federal circuit courts 
of appeals had adopted that test, and the test is consistent with other 
federal and U.S. Supreme Court cases brought under ADEA and 
FHA Title VII cases. The use of the test permits a plaintiff alleging 
discrimination to prove discrimination under the Fair Housing Act 
under a three-prong analysis: 
• First, the plaintiff must show that a policy or practice of govern-
ment has a disparate impact on a protected class of persons pro-
32. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Proj-
ect, No. 13-1371, 2014 WL 7336683, at *23 (U.S., filed Oct. 28, 2013) [U.S. Brief 
Supporting Respondents ICP] (outlining the controlling disparate impact cases in 
the eleven circuits). 
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1988). 
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 36l4(a). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4) (1995). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c) (1988). 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c) (1988). 
38. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-12, Texas Department of Housing 
and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (No. 
13-1371) (where Justice Scalia asked the Solicitor General of Texas, Scott Keller, 
why the amendments don't "kill" TDHCA's case, Solicitor Keller did not appear to 
provide Scalia with a satisfying answer). 
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tected under the FHA: race, religion, national origin, family sta-
tus, handicapped status. 
• Second, the defendant local government must be given an oppor-
tunity to rebut the charge of discrimination by demonstrating that 
the practice or policy is not for discriminatory purposes, but for a 
benign and neutral public goal or purpose or policy, such as pro-
tection of the health, safety, and welfare of the community; 
• Third, the plaintiff alleging discrimination may still succeed if the 
plaintiff can show there are other, less burdensome methods to ac-
complish the benign and neutral goals the defendant government 
claims for the purposes of the challenged public policy. 
Justice Kennedy concentrated his Supreme Court opinion primarily on 
the first prong. First, he stated that there would be no liability for gov-
ernment if the challenge and allegation of disparate impact are based 
solely on a showing of statistical disparity. Second, that statistical dis-
parity must also fail if plaintiffs cannot point to a policy of the offend-
ing government, rather than a simple instance of an action which has 
such a statistical disparate impact. The Court said that "racial imbal-
ance alone does not without more establish a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact" and "fiscal disparity must fail if plaintiff cannot point a 
defendant's policy causing disparity." The Court characterized this as 
a "robust causality requirement." The Court distinguished between 
"artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers," which should be struck 
down under disparate impact analysis, and "displacement of valid gov-
ernmental policies," which should not. 
In considering the second and third prongs, the Court said that it 
would be "paradoxical to construe the FHA to impose onerous costs 
on actors who encourage revitalization of dilapidated housing merely 
because some other priority might seem preferable." 
According to Justice Kennedy's opinion in ICP, "disparate-impact 
liability has always been properly limited in key respects that avoid 
the serious constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, 
for instance, if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing 
of a statistical disparity."39 Further, "[d]isparate-impact liability man-
dates the 'removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,' 
not the displacement of valid governmental policies."4o Accordingly, 
39. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
40. Id. at 2522. 
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"[t]he FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder 
their priorities, [but rather] aims to decision may not be a policy at 
all."41 Similarly, "[i]t may also be difficult to establish causation be-
cause of the multiple factors that go into investment decisions about 
where to construct or renovate housing units ... "42 
3. Iep ON REMAND 
The district court's treatment of ICP on remand from the Supreme 
Court best illustrates how lower courts are construing ICP as elevating 
the burden for plaintiffs, particularly at the prima facie stage. Prior to 
the Fifth Circuit's and Supreme Court's decisions in ICP, the district 
court had granted plaintiff Inclusive Communities Project (lCP) partial 
summary judgment, finding it had sufficiently established a prima facie 
case of disparate impact.43 On remand from the Supreme Court, how-
ever, the district court found it necessary to reconsider whether ICP 
had established a prima facie case, noting that it had previously done 
so "without the benefit of the Supreme Court's opinion."44 
Relying upon Justice Kennedy's cautionary language, the district 
court concluded that it had not previously "give[n] the prima facie re-
quirement the same emphasis the Supreme Court had given it."45 The 
court noted that, while it had not relied solely evidence of statistical 
evidence alone, the other sources ICP cited also largely relied upon 
statistical evidence, and thus the court arguably had "not analyze[d] 
ICP's evidence through the prism of the 'robust causality requirement' 
envisioned by the Supreme Court."46 
The court further emphasized that the Texas Department of Housing 
& Community Affairs (TDHCA) also did not have the benefit of the 
Supreme Court's decision.47 Noting that TDHCA "essentially d[id] not 
contest ICP's prima facie case," the court concluded that "TDHCA 
should be permitted to challenge ICP's prima facie showing based on 
4l. Id. 
42. Id. at 2523-24. 
43. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 
F. Supp. 2d 486, 500 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
44. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, No. 
3:08-CV-0546-D, 2015 WL 5916220, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2015). 
45. Id. at *3; see also id. (in its order granting partial summary judgment, the dis-
trict court had previously stated that "ICP's prima facie burden is not a heavy one," 
explaining that "ICP need only provide evidence that raises an inference of discrimi-
nation" because "we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely 
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." (citation omitted». 
46.Id. 
47. Id. at *4. 
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a clearer understanding of the requirements and consequences of ICP's 
establishing a prima facie case."48 Consequently, "the interests of justice 
and fundamental fairness require[d] not only that ICP's disparate impact 
claim be decided anew under the burden-shifting regimen adopted by 
HUD and the Fifth Circuit, but that the court state with whether ICP 
has established a prima facie case."49 
4. OTHER CASES FOCUSING ON ICP'S CAUTIONARY 
LANGUAGE 
Other lower courts have similarly stressed Justice Kennedy's caution-
ary language. For example, in Azam v. City of Columbia Heights,50 the 
plaintiff alleged that the city's enforcement of its health and safety 
codes with respect to his rental properties "ha[d] the effect of making 
affordable rental dwellings unavailable ... [resulting in] a disparate 
impact [on] persons intended to be protected by the [FHA]."51 In 
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court 
found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact, particularly the "robust causality requirement" and, in any 
event, failed to submit an alternative practice with a lesser impact.52 
Similarly, in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co.,53 the city al-
leged that some of Wells Fargo's lending practices were having a dis-
parate impact on racial minorities.54 Relying upon the Supreme Court's 
guidance in ICP, the court found that the city's insufficient "statistical 
disparity evidence"55 and failure to identify a "policy" causing the pur-
ported disparate impact entitled the defendant to summary judgment. 56 
Additionally, in Ellis v. City of Minneapolis,57 the district court fo-
cused on what ICP requires from plaintiffs in pleading a claim of dis-
parate impact under the FHA. 58 There, the plaintiff brought a number 
of claims relating to the city's allegedly "unlawful housing policies 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. No. CV 14-1044 (JRTIBRT), 2016 WL 424966, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2016). 
5l. Id. at * 10 (some alterations in original). 
52. Id. at * ll. The court also noted that the city had a legitimate justification in 
ensuring compliance with its health and safety codes and the plaintiff had failed to 
provide a viable alternative, as required under the burden-shifting standard. Id. 
53. No. 213CV090070DWRZX, 2015 WL 4398858, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 
2015). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at *8 (the city had argued that 12 of the 4,260 loans to minority borrowers-
or 0.28 percent of all loans issued to minorities---demonstrated a disparate impact 
claim under the FHA). 
56. Id. *7-8. 
57. No. l4-CV-3045-SRN/JJK, 2015 WL 5009341, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2015). 
58. Id. at *8-12. 
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and heightened enforcement of those policies against inner-city land-
lords in a discriminatory manner."59 After reiterating Justice Kennedy's 
"cautionary language," including the "robust causality requirement," the 
court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a prima 
facie case of disparate impact.6o Specifically, the court found that, 
even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff s alleged statistics demon-
strated a disparate impact, the plaintiff had failed to plead any facts 
demonstrating a causal link between the challenged policies and the 
disparity.6l 
Finally, the only plaintiff-friendly decision came in Rhode Island 
Commission for Human Rights v. Graul. 62 There, the Rhode Island 
Commission for Human Rights brought an action against a landlord, 
asserting claims under the FHA, based on allegations that the landlord 
denied housing to family based on familial status.63 Specifically, the 
Commission alleged that the landlord misinterpreted Rhode Island's 
residential occupancy code's square footage requirement to assert a 
"two heads per bedroom" policy based, which in turn prohibited fam-
ilies of three from occupying one bedroom units in the apartment com-
plex.64 In granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to 
liability only, the court concluded that the plaintiff satisfied all three 
steps of the burden -shifting framework. 65 Interestingly, the court did 
not cite directly to ICP or HUD's regulations for its burden-shifting 
59. Id. at * 1 (plaintiff s claims allege that (1) the city has failed to conduct and 
implement reports analyzing impediment to fair housing as required by its receipt 
of federal funds; and (2) the city's dwelling licensing scheme has displaced hundreds 
of protected-class families from their rental homes). 
60. Id. at * 10. 
6l. Id. The court further found that the defendant had satisfied its burden of dem-
onstrating a legitimate interests being furthered by its polices and that the plaintiff had 
failed to allege any viable alternative for the city to accomplish its legitimate 
objectives. 
62. No. 13-445-M-LDA, 2015 WL 4868904, at *1 (D.R.I. Aug. 13,2015). 
63. Id. at *1 (the Commission brought the action on behalf of a family of three 
whose defendant-landlord was attempting to evict from their one bedroom apartment). 
64. Id. The occupancy code provided that "[e]very bedroom occupied by one person 
shall contain at least 70 square feet (6.5 m2) of floor area, and every bedroom occupied 
by more than one person shall contain at least 50 square feet (4.6 m2) of floor area for 
each occupant thereof." Id. Apparently relying upon advice from a building inspector, 
the landlord interpreted this provision as requiring 70 square feet for the first occupant 
and an additional 50 square feet for every additional occupant thereafter-i.e., 170 square 
feet for a room occupied by three people. Id. at * 11. As the court pointed out, however, a 
proper interpretation requires only 50 square feet per person when more than one person 
is occupying the room-i.e., 150 square feet. Id. Thus, under a proper interpretation, 
the plaintiffs only needed 150 square feet-precisely the size of their bedroom-not 
170 square feet as the landlord had been attempting to require. 
65. Id. at *9-13. 
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standard, but rather relied upon its prior case law, which espoused a 
similar three-step analysis. 66 
Crossroads Residents Organized for Stable and Secure 
Residencies v. MAP Crossroads Apartments LLC, 2016 WL 
3661146 (D. Minn. July 5, 2016) 
Crossroads apartment complex recently completed a major renovation. 
The complex sent notice to the current tenants notifying them that 
their leases would terminate at the end of their current lease terms. 
The tenants had the option to reapply to renew the lease, but they 
would be subject to new rental criteria, including a 625 or higher credit 
score, income three times the rent, Social Security numbers, and pos-
itive rental history. The majority of the tenants who reside in the com-
plex are low-income, with a significant number of ethnic minorities or 
disabled. The plaintiffs argued that the new policies have a disparate 
impact on protected classes under the Fair Housing Act. The court agreed, 
finding that the plaintiffs were successful at establishing a prima facie 
case, even under the "robust causality requirement" discussed in Inclusive 
Communities. "Plaintiffs' causation argument is straightforward: Defen-
dants' policies are the reason they are unable to remain at the complex." 
Rosy Giron De Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited, 2016 
WL 4582049 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1,2016) 
Waples Mobile Home Park enacted a new policy, which requires, as a 
condition of entering into or renewing a lease at the Park that all adults 
living or seeking to live in the Park present either an original Social Se-
curity card, or an original passport, U.S. visa, and original arrival/depar-
ture Form 1-94 or I -94W. The policy was only applicable to leaseholders 
previously; however, in mid-20I5 the Mobile Home Park began apply-
ing the policy to all residents over the age of eighteen. Now, if any adult 
resident cannot satisfy the policy's documentation requirement, the ten-
ant has twenty-one days to cure the deficiency; tenants who cannot do 
so are then given thirty days to vacate the Park. The plaintiffs argue that 
the enforcement of the new policy violates the Fair Housing Act, be-
cause most of the residents in the Park are undocumented immigrants 
of Latino descent, and the policy causes a statistical disparity adverse 
to protected minorities that is sufficient to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination "because of' a plaintiff's protected national ori-
gin. The court rejects the plaintiffs' arguments under disparate impact 
66. See, e.g., id. *8-9 (citing Langlois v. Abington Housing Auth., 207 F.3d 43,51 
(1st Cir. 2000». 
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stating, "Plaintiffs' use of the disparate impact theory in this case is not 
consistent with a robust causality requirement; it operates instead to 
eliminate the statute's explicit requirement that the bar to housing be 
"because of' race or national origin. Indeed, to permit plaintiffs to use 
disparate impact in this case to establish causation results in essentially 
writing out of the FHA its robust causation requirement altogether." The 
court clarifies that the policy does not discriminate against the Latinos 
due to their national origin, but rather because they had not yet received 
citizenship. "The disparate impact theory can hardly meet the FHA's re-
quirement to show discrimination "because of' race or national origin 
when a housing policy lawfully targets illegal aliens (the vast majority 
of whom, incidentally, are Latinos)." However, the court continues to 
state that while the plaintiffs may not solely rely on disparate impact 
in their argument, their allegations are sufficient to state a claim under 
the FHA. The implementation of the policy may be pretext for discrimi-
nation against Latinos; the plaintiffs use any evidence of discrimination, 
including evidence of disparate impact, to show that the policy is in fact 
a pretext for intentional racial of national origin discrimination. 
The history and purpose of disparate impact theory, and the application of that the-
ory in the decided cases, make clear that it would be inappropriate to permit plain-
tiffs to use disparate impact theory alone to satisfy the FHA's "because of' require-
ment. Disparate impact theory, applied in this case, would be insufficient by itself to 
satisfy the FHA's causation requirement. This is not to say that landlords have free 
reign to discriminate against illegal aliens as Latinos, nor that Latinos or illegal 
aliens are categorically precluded from the benefits of the FHA, including the dis-
parate impact theory. To the contrary, an illegal alien who can prove discrimination 
on the basis of his or her race or national origin is undoubtedly a "person" entitled 
to the benefit of the FHA's protection. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (protecting "any 
person"). Also, there may well be cases in which the adversity Latinos face in ob-
taining housing stems from the same sources of historical, state-sanctioned inten-
tional discrimination faced by, for example, African-Americans. In those cases, dis-
parate impact theory may be sufficient, by itself, to carry the burden of satisfying 
the FHA's causation requirement. But in this case, the analysis here makes clear 
that plaintiffs cannot rely solely on disparate impact to satisfy the FHA's causation 
requirement; plaintiffs must still show that the Policy was instituted "because of' 
race or national origin. In doing so, plaintiffs may use evidence of disparate impact, 
in addition to other proof, to meet their burden of demonstrating causation. 
City of Joliet, Illinois v. New West, L.P., 825 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 
June 17,2016) 
The City of Joliet commenced condemnation proceedings against an 
apartment complex. New West argued that Evergreen Terrace was 
not dilapidated and that the city's suit should have been rejected on 
that ground, and on the further ground that razing the buildings 
would have a disparate impact on its predominantly black tenants, 
702 THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 49, No.4 FALL 2017 
in violation of the Fair Housing Act. New West relies more heavily on 
its disparate-impact theory than on its disparate-treatment theory. 
About 95% of Evergreen Terrace's residents are black, and New 
West contends that this means that its closure must have a disparate 
impact. Since § 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.c. § 3604(a), 
forbids actions with unjustified disparate impact, New West maintains 
that closure necessarily violates the Act. 
The court states that, although Inclusive Communities Project held 
that unjustified disparate impact from housing policies violates § 804(a), 
it stressed the importance of considering both whether a policy exists 
and whether it is justified. Disparate-impact analysis looks at the effects 
of policies, not one-off decisions, which are analyzed for disparate treat-
ment. The Supreme Court added that "governmental entities ... must 
not be prevented from achieving legitimate objectives, such as ensuring 
compliance with health and safety codes." The district court's findings 
show that the condemnation of Evergreen Terrace is a specific decision, 
not part of a policy to close minority housing in Joliet. The judge also 
found that Joliet set out to achieve goals that the Supreme Court ap-
proves, and the analysis of Inclusive Communities Project therefore fa-
vors the city rather than New West. 
Patton v. Hanassab, 2016 WL 4507022 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) 
The plaintiff is a disabled Native American, who lives in the defen-
dant's apartment complex, with the assistance of Section 8 vouchers. 
The plaintiff moved in to the apartment in 2007 and did not have any 
issues until new property managers were hired in 2011. The property 
managers made discriminatory comments to the plaintiff and did not 
make certain repairs to his unit that were made in other units. The 
plaintiff was continually given notice to vacate for no apparent reason. 
The plaintiff argues the defendant violated the Fair Housing Act under 
the disparate treatment theory. The court stated that when plaintiffs 
have provided direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory in-
tent, they have established a prima facie case of disparate treatment 
and may be able to survive a motion for summary judgment on that 
evidence alone. The court found that the plaintiff had enough evidence 
to establish a prima facie case against the defendant. 
Cobb County, Dekalb County and Fulton County v. Bank of 
America Corporation, 2016 WL 2937467 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2016) 
Plaintiffs allege that Bank of America has engaged in mortgage lend-
ing discrimination directed at minority borrowers within the counties' 
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borders for the past 15 years. The court finds that the plaintiffs' claims 
do not satisfy the test set forth in Inclusive Communities and therefore 
their claim fails. The plaintiffs alleged the discrimination was inten-
tional, rather than a facially neutral policy. Therefore the plaintiffs 
cannot meet the third prong of the test, i.e., the policy is artificial, ar-
bitrary, and unnecessary. Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs did 
not establish causality, because the plaintiffs must demonstrate how 
the defendant's policy caused racial imbalance, rather than simply al-
leging that more minority borrowers were receiving undesirable loans. 
The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, but allowed to 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint. 
Veasey v. Abbott, 2016 WL 3923868 (5th Cir. July 20, 2016) 
The State of Texas passed a bill requiring voters to present specific 
forms of identification at the polls; the change in the requirements dis-
proportionately affected minority groups. Plaintiffs argued that the bill 
violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, because the bill has a discriminatory effect. 
The court analyzed the discriminatory effect under the Gingles factors 
and a two-part framework. The majority opinion finds that the bill was 
racially discriminatory under the Voting Rights Act. The dissent ar-
gues that the majority opinion misconstrues the law. Under their anal-
ysis, the plaintiffs would have failed to meet the robust causality re-
quirement set forth in Inclusive Communities, as the majority relied 
solely on some statistical disparity between minorities and whites, 
without any evidence that the bill caused the disparity, therefore not 
satisfying the causality requirement set forth by the Supreme Court. 
Winfield v. City of New York, 2016 WL 6208564 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016) 
The plaintiffs are three African Americans living in New York City. 
They allege that the city is racially segregated by its districts and 
that the city further perpetuates that segregation through its "Commu-
nity Preference Policy." The policy requires that developers of low-
income housing hold a lottery for those interested in residing in the 
units, and that the developer reserve 50% of the housing opportunities 
for those already living in the community. In the disparate impact 
analysis, the court recognized the a disparate impact claim is available 
under FHA, and that plaintiffs who fail to allege facts at the pleading 
stage or produce statistical information demonstrating a causal con-
nection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact. The 
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court finds that a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a 
pleading requirement, and therefore the plaintiffs have established 
their burden of giving rise to a plausible inference that the challenged 
policy causes a disparate impact. 
A venue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, Arizona, 
818 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2016) 
Real estate developers brought action against the City of Yuma, claim-
ing that the city's refusal to rezone their 42-acre property to permit 
higher-density development violated the Fair Housing Act. The city 
conducted two analyses, which showed that Hispanics were generally 
located in concentrated regions around the city, and that substantially 
all of the available low-to-moderate-income housing was available in 
those areas. The analysis also showed that whites concentrated in sep-
arate areas and comprised of 75% of the population. The land owned 
by plaintiff was within the white-majority areas. With the collapse of 
the housing market, the plaintiffs realized there was no longer a de-
mand for 8,000 square foot lots, but there was a need for more afford-
able housing. The plaintiffs requested the rezoning, and the city's staff 
and in-house planning experts both recommended approval of the zon-
ing request. The City Council held a public hearing in which the 
neighboring communities objected to the rezoning, claiming the devel-
oper had a history of building in low-cost, high crime neighborhoods 
that catered to Hispanics. The court recognized that a disparate treat-
ment claim was plausible, as well as a potential claim for disparate im-
pact. The developers allege specific facts demonstrating city officials' 
awareness that the effect of their denial of the developers' application 
would "bear more heavily on one race than another" in light of histor-
ical patterns of segregation by race and class. The city relied on the 
decision in Hallmark Developers v. Fulton County, arguing that the 
city was able to deny the request because there was similarly priced 
housing available in another area of the city. The court rejects that rea-
soning, as the Inclusive Communities decision had been decided, and 
the reasoning in Hallmark would run directly against the goals of the 
FHA. The court rejected the Hallmark analysis of disparate impact 
claims and remanded the case to be evaluated under the Inclusive 
Communities causality analysis. 
Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177 (D. Mass. 2015) 
The plaintiffs are Boston police officers, who brought suit against the 
City of Boston alleging that the examinations used to select which of-
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ficers to promote had a disparate impact against the minority police 
officers. The court reviewed the statistical results from past examina-
tions, as well as testimony from expert witnesses, and concluded there 
was sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection required after 
the Inclusive Communities decision. The plaintiffs met their burden of 
proof to show that the disparity between races was not the result of 
mere chance. The burden then shifted to the city to show that the ex-
amination was a "business necessity." The court found that the results 
of the examination did not correlate to job performance and were 
therefore potentially liable under disparate impact. 
City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2016 WL 1156882 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 17,2016) 
The plaintiff brought suit against Wells Fargo alleging that the eco-
nomic impact of its policy and practice of steering minority borrowers 
in Miami into mortgage loans that have higher costs and risks, and for 
its policy of refusing to extend credit to minority borrowers who de-
sired to refinance had a disparate impact when compared to their 
white borrowers. The court found, using the Inclusive Communities 
analysis that the plaintiff failed to meet the second, third, and fourth 
prong of the test. The court reasoned: 
First, the policies alleged by the City are not facially neutral. Rather, the City's 
contentions that minority borrowers were "targeted" are comprised of allegations 
that minorities were intentionally discriminated against, not allegations that a neu-
tral policy or policies produced a statistical imbalance. In fact, the City alleges a 
pattern of steering minority borrowers into disadvantageous loans. This is alleged 
intentional conduct, which is not a basis for a disparate impact FHA claim under 
the pleading standards set forth in Inclusive Communities. The City also fails to al-
lege facts demonstrating that the Defendants' alleged policies constituted "artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers." 
Finally, the City fails to meet Inclusive Communities' "robust causality require-
ment," which requires the City to "allege facts at the pleading stage ... demonstrat-
ing a causal connection" between the challenged policy and the alleged statistical 
disparity. 
In conclusion, while there has yet to be a particularly notable deci-
sion subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in ICP, its effect is 
palpable. Lower courts appear to be in agreement that, although the 
Court found disparate impact claims cognizable under the FHA, ICP 
nevertheless requires more from plaintiffs at the pleading and prima 
facie stages. The district court's treatment of ICP on remand from 
the Supreme Court, having found it necessary to reevaluate its prior 
decision that ICP had sufficiently made out a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact, best illustrates this effect. 
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The remedy, therefore, absent a showing of discriminatory intent, is 
discriminatory impact under the Federal Fair Housing Act. The usual 
way of showing such impact is by showing disparate impact on a pro-
tected class. 
C. Affirmative Fair Housing 
Affirmatively providing fair housing is required of recipients of fed-
eral funds under the Housing and Community Development Act of 
1974. In particular, the grantee of such funds must certify that the 
grant will conducted and administered in conformity with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act and that the grantee 
will affirmati vel y further fair housing. This section discusses HUD' s 
implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects 
Standard promulgated by a final rule, 24 c.F.R. Part 100. 
A local government applicant for HUD housing funds has always 
had to prepare consolidated plans and an analysis of impediments to 
fair and affordable housing its jurisdiction, and certify that the grant 
recipient will affirmatively further fair housing as required by the FHA. 
Following United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro 
New York v. Westchester County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009), these requirements have been increased and tightened. In Westche-
ster County, the county was found to have made a false or fraudulent 
claim because it had not sufficiently analyzed racial discrimination as 
an impediment to fair housing and had not taken steps to require produc-
tion of affordable housing in certain of the municipalities in the county. 
The county settled by paying a $62 million fine, constructing 750 units of 
affordable housing in non-minority areas, and undertaking affirmative 
marketing of such affordable units. As a result of this litigation, the affir-
mative obligations ofHUD affordable housing funds recipients are: (1) de-
fine affirmatively furthering fair housing and related terms; (2) make a 
new assessment of fair housing process and tools; (3) focus on patterns 
of segregation as compared to prior regulatory regime; and (4) in partic-
ular focus on the effect of regulations like zoning codes on affordable 
housing. 
There is an increasing overlap between fair housing and affordable 
housing. Local government/municipal actions that have the effect of 
reducing the supply of affordable housing are increasingly vulnerable 
to claims that such actions have a disparate impact on a protected class 
of persons under the Inclusive Communities (and other federal circuit 
court cases) standards. Thus, for example, women, ethnic and racial 
minorities, and persons with disabilities can all be defined as compar-
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atively low-income wage earners. Therefore, so the reasoning goes, 
making it difficult for these groups to find affordable housing can be 
construed as having a disparate impact on a protected class. In the con-
text of local land use controls such as zoning, the following either 
drive up the cost of housing and/or prevent the construction of afford-
able housing in a municipality: 
1. minimum lot size 
2. minimum house size 
3. restrictions on multi-family development or density 
4. restrictions on manufactured housing 
5. costly design and site development standards (landscaping, open 
space/side-front yards, expensive materials) 
6. restrictions on group living arrangements for FHAA protected 
classes, like spacing requirements, special or conditional permit 
requirements, and development or service standards 
III. Inclusionary Zoning: Mandatory Set-Asides or 
Quotas of Affordable, Workforce Housing as a 
Land Development Condition 
As the costs of providing affordable, workforce housing increase and 
the burdens upon local government of providing such housing using 
federal (HUD) funds, together with the risk of compliance failure as 
noted in Part II above also increases, the trend toward obtaining 
such housing from private sector land developers as conditions for de-
velopment approval also increase. Such mandatory affordable housing 
requirements are subject to the standards set out by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a series of three cases decided between 1987 and 2015, none 
of which deal with affordable housing requirements per se. As a result, 
some state supreme courts have decided that the federal standards set 
by the U.S. Supreme Court do not apply to mandatory fair/affordable 
housing quotas. 
A. The Federal Cases 
While much of the recent case law dealing with such conditions and 
exactions has developed from challenges to impact fees, the language 
is applicable to all three. To be enforceable and valid, an impact fee 
must be levied upon a development to pay for public facilities, the 
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need for which is generated, at least in part, by that development. 67 
This is the so-called "rational nexus" test developed by the courts in 
Florida and other jurisdictions that have considered such fees and ex-
actions.6s First proposed in 1964,69 it became the national standard by 
the end of the 1970s.7o The test essentially has two parts. First, the par-
ticular development must generate a need to which the amount of the 
exaction bears some rough proportionate relationship. Second, the 
local government must demonstrate that the fees levied will actually 
be used for the purpose collected.71 
This test was made applicable to all land development conditions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987. Decided on the last day of the 
Court's 1987 term, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission72 deals 
ostensibly with beach access. Property owners James and Marilyn 
Nollan sought a coastal development permit from the California 
Coastal Commission to tear down a beach house and build a bigger 
one. The commission granted the permit only upon condition that 
the owners give the general public the right to walk across the owners' 
backyard beach area, an easement over one-third of the lot's total area. 
The purpose, the commission said, was to preserve visual access to the 
water, which was impaired by the much bigger beach house. The 
Court, however, held that, assuming the commission's purpose to 
overcome the psychological barrier to the beach created by overdevel-
opment was a valid public purpose, it could not accept that there was 
67. DAVID CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE, at ch. 4; Julian Con-
rad Juergenmeyser, Funding Infrastructure: Paying the Costs of Growth Through Im-
pact Fees and Other Land Regulation Charges (James C. Nicholas ed., 1985) [here-
inafter Juergenmeyser, Funding Infrastructure]; Brian W. Blaesser & Christine M. 
Kentopp, Impact Fees: The Second Generation, 38 WASH. U.J. URE. & CONTEMP. L. 
28 (1990); David L. Callies, Impact Fees, Exactions and Paying for Growth in Ha-
wai'i, 11 U. HAW. L. REv. 295 (1989) [hereinafter Callies, Impact Fees]. 
68. See, e.g., Hernando Cty. v. Budget Inns of Fla., Inc., 555 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990); Frisella v. Town of Farmington, 550 A.2d 102 (N.H. 1988); Baltica 
Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd. of Franklin Twp., 537 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1987); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 387 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 1990); Unlimited v. 
Kitsap Cty., 750 P.2d 651 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). 
69. Ira Michael Heyman & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing 
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); see also Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy Stroud, Legal 
Aspects of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS (Frank & Rhodes ed. 
1987) [hereinafter Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Aspects]. 
70. See Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Aspects, supra note 69, at 74. 
7l. Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy E. Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land 
Development Linkage, 9 NOVA L. REv. 381, 397-99 (1985) [hereinafter Bosselman & 
Stroud, Mandatory Tithes]; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 
A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990). 
72. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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any nexus between that interest or purpose and the public lateral ac-
cess or easement condition attached to the permit. 73 
The Court stated, however, that it is an altogether different matter if 
there is an "essential nexus" between the condition and what the land-
owner proposes to do with the property.74 Thus, local governments 
must consider several important factors when levying impact fees: 
1. The fees must generally be charged as part of the land develop-
ment process, not the land reclassification or rezoning process. 
Fees are development-driven, and land reclassification, while it 
may well be a prelude to development, does not create any 
need for public facilities whatsoever. 75 
2. Collected fees do not belong in the general fund, or the need is 
questionable. 
3. The fees cannot be kept by government indefinitely, or the need 
is questionable. 
Ignoring the foregoing raises a presumption, as a matter of both law 
and policy, that the impact fee is nothing more than a revenue-raising 
device, either for a facility that has nothing to do with the land devel-
opment upon which the fee is raised, or for undetermined fiscal pur-
poses generally. In either case, the "fee" is then presumed to be a 
tax. This characterization as a tax is almost always fatal to an impact 
fee since most local governments have very little specific authority to 
tax beyond the property tax and, occasionally, a sales or income tax. 
Because an impact fee is none of the above, and because all local gov-
73. Id. at 838-39. For full discussion, see J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the 
"Essential Nexus": How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan 
and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373 (2002). 
74. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37; see also CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LAND USE, supra note 67; Bosselman & Stroud, Mandatory Tithes, supra note 71; 
Brenda Valla, Linkage: The Next Stop in Development Exactions, 2 GROWTH MGMT. 
STUDIES NEWSLETTER 4 (1987); Callies, Impact Fees, supra note 67; Jerold S. Kayden 
& Robert Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analysis, 50 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1987); Rachelle Alterman, Evaluating Linkage and Beyond, 
32 WASH. U. J. URE. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1988). But see Holmdel Builders 
Ass'n, 583 A.2d 277 (upholding impact fees for housing as functional equivalents 
of mandatory set-asides, which the court had already approved under New Jersey's 
constitutionally based "fair share" doctrine). 
75. Although in California such fees are charged when land is rezoned to planned 
unit development (PUD), a special zone in most jurisdictions, often carrying with it 
developmental rights. 
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ernment taxes must be supported by specific statutory authority, the 
fee is almost always declared illegaP6 
The Nollan Court did not discuss the required degree of connection 
between the exaction imposed and the projected impacts of the pro-
posed development. This issue was left open until 1994 when the Su-
preme Court decided Dolan v. City of Tigard.77 In this 5-4 decision, 
the Court held for the first time that a city must demonstrate a "reason-
able relationship" between the conditions imposed on a development 
permit and the development's impact.78 
Florence Dolan owned a plumbing business and electrical supply 
store located in the business district of Tigard, Oregon, along Fanno 
Creek, which flowed through the southwestern corner of the lot and 
along its western boundary. Dolan applied to the city for a building 
permit to double the size of the store and pave the 39-space parking 
lot. To mitigate for increased runoff from her property that would result 
from her expansion plans, the commission required that Dolan dedicate 
to the city the portion of her property lying within the 100-year flood 
plain along Fanno Creek for a public greenway. To mitigate for in-
creased traffic and congestion caused by an increase in visitors to her 
store, the commission also required that Dolan dedicate an additional 
IS-foot strip of land adjacent to the flood plain as a public pedestrian 
and bicycle pathway. 
While in Dolan there was a clear nexus between the impact of the 
proposed development and the conditions required by the commission, 
the Supreme Court adds a second test beyond "nexus"; whether the de-
gree or amount of the exactions demanded by the city's permit condi-
tions were sufficiently related to the projected impact of the develop-
ment proposed. The Court coined the term "rough proportionality" to 
describe the required relationship between the exactions and the pro-
jected impact of the proposed development.79 While "[n]o precise 
mathematical calculation is required . . . the city must make some 
76. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., Inc. v. Riddel, 510 P.2d 376 
(Ariz. 1973); Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1983); Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982). See generally 
Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure, supra note 67. 
77. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
78. Id. at 390. 
79. Id. at 39l. After coining the term "rough proportionality," the Court, in its ma-
jority opinion, never used that term again when it applied its decision to the facts; in-
stead it continued to use the words "required reasonable relationship" or "reasonably 
related." Notably, the Court rejected stricter standards as the constitutional norm. See 
Herron v. Mayor of Annapolis, 388 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570-71 (D. Md. 2005). 
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sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related 
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."so 
The Court reviewed the exactions (the two required dedications of 
the public greenway and the pedestrian and bicycle pathway) and 
found that the city's burden on the development was not roughly pro-
portional to the adverse effects of the development would create. 
Therefore, the exactions were unconstitutional. 
Together, Nollan and Dolan require that to pass constitutional mus-
ter, land development conditions imposed by government must: 
1. Seek to promote a legitimate state interest; 
2. Be related to the land development project upon which they are 
being levied by means of a rational or essential nexus; and 
3. Be proportional to the need or problem which the land develop-
ment project is expected to cause, and the project must accord-
ingly benefit from the condition imposed. 
Under the first standard, legitimate state interest, an agency may 
only require a landowner to dedicate land (or interests in land) or con-
tribute money for public projects and purposes, such as public facili-
ties and, in most jurisdictions, public housing. 
Under the second standard, essential nexus, an agency must find a 
close connection between the need or problem generated by the proposed 
development and the land or other exaction or fee required from the land-
owner or developer. Thus, for example, a residential development will in 
all probability generate a need for public schools and parks. A shopping 
center or hotel in all probability will not. Both will generate additional 
traffic and therefore generate a need for more streets and roads. 
Under the third standard, proportionality, a residential development of, 
say, three hundred units may well generate a need for additional class-
room space, but almost certainly, not a new school or school site. On 
the other hand, such a residential development of several thousand units 
would, when constructed, likely generate a need for a new school and 
school site, depending upon the demographics of the new residents. 
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Koontz v. St. fohns 
River Water Management District, holding that both the Nollan and 
Dolan nexus and proportionality requirements apply to monetary ex-
actions like mitigation fees, in-lieu fees, and impact fees, as well as 
government-required dedication of land or interests in land (such as 
80. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 39l. 
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easements). Thus, for example, government could constitutionally re-
quire a land owner to provide a public school site or in-lieu fee as a 
condition for approval of a large residential development, or a fee rep-
resenting a development's fair share of the cost of such a school site 
on a small residential development. However, it could not require ei-
ther a site or a fee from a commercial center development for lack of a 
nexus: commercial developments do not drive a need for schools, but 
residential developments do. 
A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE: NEXUS 
Because impact or "linkage" fees for affordable or workforce housing 
are a form of exaction, they are subject to the "essential nexus" takings 
test of Nollan. 81 Under Nollan, "a permit condition that serves the same 
legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue to permit should not 
be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue to permit would not con-
stitute a taking."82 In addition, under Nollan, the government bears the 
burden of proving this nexus.83 Linkage fees satisfy this test "only if 
the municipality can show that development contributes to the housing 
problem84 the linkage exaction is intended to remedy.,,85 
There is no disagreement in federal courts that Nollan's nexus test, 
or its close equivalent, applies to linkage fees. For example, in Com-
mercial Builders of Northern California v. Sacramento,86 the Ninth 
Circuit held that an ordinance that imposed a linkage "fee in connec-
tion with the issuance of permits for nonresidential development of the 
type that will generate jobs,,,87 (in other words, a workforce affordable 
housing requirement) was constitutional under Nollan. 88 Plaintiffs 
8l. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); see Commercial 
Builders of N. Cal. v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991). 
82. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 (emphasis added). 
83. Dolan, 512 U.S. 391 n.8 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836). 
84. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 9.23. A "housing problem" is the typ-
ical interest that the counties of Hawai'i identify as a legitimate state interest in their 
ordinances. See, e.g., MAUl, HAW., CODE § 2.94.010 (2007) ("The council finds that 
there is a critical shortage of affordable housing in the county."); HAWAI'I, HAW., 
CODE § 11-2(5)(2010) (setting forth the objective of "Requir[ing] large resort and in-
dustrial enterprises to address related affordable housing needs as a condition of re-
zoning approvals, based upon current economic and housing conditions"). In Ass'n 
of Owners v. Honolulu, 742 P.2d. 974 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987), the Intermediate 
Court of Appeals of Hawai'i acknowledged the legitimacy of this interest in the con-
text of the challenge to a condominium declaration, stating that "affordable housing 
and public parking for downtown Honolulu were important to the welfare of the com-
munity." Id. at 985. 
85. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 84, § 9.23. 
86. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
87. Id. at 873 (emphasis added). 
88. Id. at 875. 
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challenged the ordinance directly on Nollan grounds: lack of nexus or 
connection between the development and the affordable housing con-
dition. First, the court addressed the holding of Nollan. Nollan holds 
that where there is no evidence of a nexus between the development 
and the problem that the exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot 
be upheld. 89 The court then explained that "the [0 ]rdinance was imple-
mented only after a detailed study revealed a substantial connection 
between development and the problem to be address."9o 
The court related at some length what the City of Sacramento did to 
establish the "substantial connection between the development and the 
problem" of affordable housing. First, it commissioned a study of the 
need for low-income housing, the effect of non-residential develop-
ment on the demand for such housing, and the appropriateness of ex-
acting fees in conjunction with such developments to pay for housing: 
[The study] estimat[ed] the percentage of new workers in the developments that 
would qualify as low-income workers and would require housing. [The study] 
also calculated fees for development. ... Also as instructed, however, in the interest 
of erring on the side of conservatism in exacting the fees, it reduced [the] final cal-
culation[] by about one-half. Based upon this study, the City of Sacramento enacted 
the Housing Trust Fund Ordinance [which] ... included the finding that nonresiden-
tial development is 'a major factor in attracting new employees to the region' and 
that the influx of new employees 'creates a need for additional housing in the City.' 
Pursuant to these findings, the Ordinance imposes a fee in connection with the issu-
ance of permits for nonresidential development of the type that will generate jobS.91 
Consequently, the court found "that the nexus between the fee provi-
sion here at issue, designed to further the city's legitimate interest in 
housing, and the burdens caused by commercial development is suffi-
cient to pass constitutional muster."92 
B. The State Cases 
Nevertheless, there are a few state cases upholding inclusionary hous-
mg programs. 
In Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa,93 
the city enacted an inclusionary zoning ordinance requiring 10% of 
all newly constructed units be affordable, but again only after the city 
made significant findings and studied possible affordable housing solu-
tions, much like the City of Sacramento.94 Moreover, the court specifi-
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
9l. Commercial Builders of N. Cal., 941 F.2d at 873. 
92. Id. at 875. 
93. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001). 
94. Id. at 62. 
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cally recognized that "The City's inclusionary zoning ordinance im-
poses significant burdens on those who wish to develop their property.,,95 
Therefore, the court noted specifically that "the ordinance also provides 
significant benefits to those who comply with its terms ... expedited pro-
cessing, fee deferrals, loans or grants and density bonuses."96 The mu-
nicipality provided over 700 pages of documentation for its program 
and set its required set-aside at only 10%. 
Also, in June 2015 the California Supreme Court rendered its deci-
sion in California Building Industry Ass'n v. City of San Jose, which 
upheld a city inclusionary zoning ordinance requiring that 15 percent 
of the dwelling units in a new development be set aside for affordable 
or workforce housing. Alternatively, the landowner could construct af-
fordable units off-site equal to 20 percent of the total projected market-
rate units or pay an in-lieu fee. While the decision applies only to Cal-
ifornia, the case has been widely reported in national media. 
The California Supreme Court specifically held that nexus and pro-
portionality do not apply to mandatory affordable housing require-
ments. Instead, the court agreed with the lower court of appeals that 
since California's planning statutes require each local government to 
formulate a comprehensive plan and to include an affordable housing 
element, the San Jose ordinance was not different from any zoning or-
dinance regulation like use, yard, and set-back regulations. Moreover, 
the court further held that the mandatory housing requirement was no 
more than the equivalent of a rent-controlled ordinance, most of which 
have been approved where litigated, especially in California. 
The court's demonstrated ignorance of basic zoning law-indeed 
local land-use controls generally-is breathtaking. Zoning ordinances 
are regulatory: They prevent certain uses or limits the size of permitted 
structures through bulk requirements such as height, setback, and yard 
maximums and minimums. By contrast, the mandatory workforce hous-
ing requirement in San Jose requires a landowner to affirmatively pro-
vide a public need or benefit-affordable housing-just as other land de-
velopment conditions require water and sewer systems, roads, schools, 
parks, and other public facilities, provided the development drives a 
need for them. There is no such need for affordable housing driven by 
or caused by a residential development for market-rate housing. 
Moreover, these decisions must be read in the context of California's 
Density Bonus Law, which requires local governments to "reward devel-
95. Id. at 64. 
96. Id. 
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opers that agree to build a certain percentage of low-income housing" 
with increased density bonuses above those permitted by applicable 
local regulations.97 While the Density Bonus Law can, by itself, be con-
sidered a voluntary inclusionary zoning program, these density bonus 
mandates are then tacked on to those already provided by a local govern-
ment's inclusionary zoning program.98 Therefore, developers building in 
jurisdictions that impose inclusionary zoning ordinances have a state 
guaranteed avenue to mitigate the burdens of providing affordable hous-
ing required by local governments, and developers who build in jurisdic-
tions without inclusionary zoning programs nonetheless have incentives 
to build affordable housing. 
California Code section 65915 requires local governments to provide 
applicants who "seek and agree to construct a housing development" con-
taining at least 5% of the units affordable to very low-income households 
or 10% of the units affordable to lower-income households with at least a 
20% density bonus.99 Developers may also set aside 10% moderate-
income affordable units but will only receive a 5% density bonus.100 In 
order to create better incentives for developers to produce affordable 
housing, the Density Bonus Law offers increased density bonuses on a 
sliding scale for developers that meet and surpass the minimum set-
aside requirements. 101 Depending upon the type of affordable unit set 
aside, developers will receive a higher percent density bonus for every 
percent increase in affordable housing they offer above the minimum 
threshold. The developer will earn an increased density bonus of 2.5% 
for every percent of very low-income housing set-aside, 1.5% for every 
percent of lower-income housing set-aside, and 1% for every percent 
of moderate-income housing set aside.102 These density bonuses are 
capped at 35%. Thus, a developer who sets aside 11 % of the develop-
ment's units for very low-income units, 20% lower-income units, or 
forty moderate-income units will earn the maximum density bonus. 103 
Although the mandatory density bonus award under the state's Density 
Bonus Law is capped at 35%, this maximum cannot be "construed to pro-
97. Shea Homes L.P. v. Cty. of Alameda, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739 (Ct. App. 2003). 
9S. BARBARA A. KAUTZ, A PUBLIC AGENCY GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA DENSITY BONUS 
LAW (2005). 
99. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65915(b)(1) (West 200S). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. § 65915(f). 
102. Id. § 65915(f)(1)-(4). 
103. Id. 
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hibit a [local government] from granting a density bonus greater" than 
that required by state law. 104 
California Code section 65915 also requires local governments to 
provide developers who meet the above mentioned minimum set-
aside requirements with incentives or concessions that "result in iden-
tifiable, financially sufficient, and actual cost reductions." 105 These 
concessions and incentives include, but are not limited to, (1) reduc-
tions in development standards, (2) modifications of zoning or build-
ing code requirements, and (3) "approval of mixed use zoning in con-
junction with the housing project" if it is compatible with the project 
and will reduce costS.l06 Local governments are required to provide de-
velopers with one concession or incentive for every 10% of the total 
units dedicated to lower-income households, 5% to very low-income 
households, or 10% to moderate-income households. l07 However, a de-
veloper may only receive up to three concessions or incentives. lOS 
104. CAL. GOy'T CODE § 65915(n) (West 2008). 
105. Id. § 65915(k). 
106. Id. § 65915(1). 
107. Id. § 65915(d)(2). 
108. Id. 
